ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Security components are crucial elements for a network security. They have been widely deployed to secure networks. A security component is placed in strategic points of a network, so that, all incoming and outgoing packets have to go through it [1, 2] .
Generally, to enhance and guarantee the system safety, the administrator enforces the network security by distributing many security components over the network. This implies cohesion of the security functions supplied by these components. A misconfiguration or a conflict between security components set of rules means that a security component , may either accept some malicious packets, which consequently creates security holes , or discard some legitimate packets, which consequently disrupts normal traffic. Both cases could cause irreparable consequences [3, 4] .
Unfortunately, it has been observed that most security components are poorly designed and have many anomalies which implies many repercussions, both on their functioning and on their interoperability, with other security components. Given the importance of the network security, such errors are not acceptable [5, 6] .
Considering the impact of the poorly designed security component set of rules on the networks' safety, it is necessary to [7, 8] :
¯ Specify and check its set of rules correctness before its installation in a network. ¯ Verify the security component interoperability with other security components on the network.
Several models are proposed for security components analysis [9, 10, 11] .In our work, we propose a decision tree-based approach composed of three processes. In the first one, we verify and correct misconfigurations in the security component set of rules and generate a new set free of anomalies.
In the second one, we will check the interoperability between several security components in the network. If the interoperability between distributed security components in a network is not confirmed, we will apply a correction process which applies a formal model to guarantee the security components interoperability.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows; section 2 presents the proposed approach. Section 3 presents the security component set of rules extraction, verification and correction process steps. Section 4 presents the security components interoperability checking process steps. Section 5 presents the interoperability correction process steps and section 6 concludes the paper.
Process 3: Security components interoperability correction
This process is executed once the security components interoperability is not confirmed (see step F). It is composed of the following steps: Figure 1 .The proposed interoperability checking approach
PROCESS 1: SECURITY COMPONENTS SET OF RULES EXTRACTION, VERIFICATION AND CORRECTION
In this section, we will tack in details the security component set of rules extraction, verification and correction process (see process 1 in figure 1 ). This process aims to: -represent the security component set of rules into a standardized format, -verify the security component set of rules relevancy, -correct the security component set of rules incoherencies. These steps prepare the security component for interoperability verification with the specific security policy.
Step A: Extraction of The Security Component Set of Rules (See Figure 1)
In previous works [12] , we have shown how to extract a security component set of rules from a security component log file. In the followings sub-sections, we will define the security component set of rules format. This format will be represented by a decision tree approach for anomalies detection and correction in the next sections.
Formal Security Component Set of Rules Representation
For a security component C x , having a set of t rules R x ={r 1 
The Decision Tree Approach
We propose to use the decision tree model to describe a security component C x set of rules. A decision tree is a formal representation defined by 3 types of entities (see figure 2 ): ¯ Nodes: represent the different attributes of a rule. They are schematized by labeled rectangles in the tree. ¯ Edges: connect the decision tree nodes. They are labeled by values or a range of values taken from the parent node domain. They are schematized by a labeled and directed arrow from the parent node to the outgoing nodes. ¯ Leaves: are terminal nodes representing the path identification. They are schematized by a labeled circle in the tree.
We can represent a security component C x with t rules by a decision tree where each path from the root to a terminal node represents a rule of ≤ ≤ represents the level in the tree and w (1 w t) ≤ ≤ the branch in the tree. ¯ For example, in figure 2, we note "UDP" and "ICMP" the labeled edges connecting the attributes "Protocol" and "Source port". ¯ Each terminal node is labeled with the specific value "Null". It represents the termination of a branch in the decision tree DT. ¯ Each path in the decision tree from the root to the leaf is identified by the branch identification b w ( ) ∧ → UDP 20 accept with ∈ ∈ ∈ UDP "Protocol", 20 "Source port", accept "Action"
In figure 2 , we note that in the decision tree DT, b 2 and b 3 have the same prefixes; the attributes A 1,1 = A 1,2 ="Protocol" and A 2,1 = A 2,2 ="Source port" . Also, the labeled edges e 1,1 = e 1,2 ="TCP". This is due to the fact that they share, respectively, the same node and the same branch. So, b 2 can also be written as follows: b 2 : A 1,1 = "Protocol"-e 1,1 = "UDP"-A 2,1 ="Source port" -e 2,2 = "20"-A 3,2 ="Action "-e 3,2 = "Accept"-Null
Case study: Security component set of rules extraction
Let's take a firewall FW as security component. By applying the set of rules extraction process on FW log file [12] , we obtain the following set of rules (see step A in figure 3 ). 
Step B: Formal Security Component Set Of Rules Checking (See Figure 1)
Let's take a security component C x . In order to study the security component C x set of rules correctness, we have chosen to represent it by a decision tree. This representation will allow us to have a better illustration of the security component. Several works [13, 14, 15] have defined a set of anomalies detectable between rules in a security component called "component anomalies".In the following, we will study these anomalies using the decision tree formalism. Then, we will propose a formal method to remove them.
Formalization Of Relations Between Rules
Let's take a decision tree DT composed of t branches (representing t rules). As mentioned above (see section 3.1.2), a branch b i corresponding to a rule r i in DT is formalized as follows: 
Security Components Anomalies Detection
An anomaly in a security component is the result of the following cases [16, 17] : ¯ The existence of two or more rules that may match the same packet ¯ The existence of a rule that can never match any packet on the network paths that cross the security component. In the following , we classify different anomalies that may exist between rules in a security component.
Property 3: Shadowing Anomaly
In a set of rules R, a rule r j is shadowed by a previous rule r i when r i matches all the packets that match r j , such that the shadowed rule r j will never be activated. In a decision tree DT, for any two
Property 4: Generalization Anomaly
The generalization anomaly is the reverse of the shadowing anomaly i.e. in a set of rules R, a rule r j is a generalization of a preceding rule r i if, on the one hand, the rule r j can match all the packets that match the rule r j and, on the other hand, the two rules have different actions. (e = e ) (e e ) (e = e ) (e e ) (e = e ) (e e )
In the next section, we will present a new approach to remove them.
3.3
Step C: Formal security component set of rules correction (see figure 1) By studying the previous anomalies properties on the decision tree (see section 3.2.2), we propose a fundamental property guarantying that the decision tree is free of anomalies. We call this property the "relevancy property". 
where k represents the "source address" attribute and z represents the "destination address" attribute.
For example, in figure 2 , the node A 1,1 (noted also "protocol") has two outgoing edges labeled e 1,1 ="UDP" and e 1, 4 We can prove that a decision tree verifying the relevancy property (property 7) is free of the anomalies presented above (see properties 3 to 6 in section 3.2.2).
Lemma 1:
A decision tree DT verifying the relevancy property doesn't contain the previous anomalies (i.e. the shadowing anomaly, the generalization anomaly, the correlation anomaly and the redundancy anomaly) (see section 3.2.2).
For example, the decision tree of figure 4 is non-relevant because branches b 1 and b 2 verify the shadowing anomaly. A similar reasoning on properties 4, 5 and 6 proves that a decision tree with the generalization anomaly, the redundancy anomaly and the correlation anomaly is a non-relevant decision tree.
To remove the decision tree DT misconfigurations, we will build another decision tree called Relevant Decision Tree (RDT) which verifies the relevancy property (see property 7). The proposed RDT will be presented in the next section.
The Relevant decision Tree (RDT):
In the following sub-sections, we first start by explaining the RDT construction principle informally, then we will present it with a formal algorithm. To do that, we need to take into account some assumptions:
Assumption 1:
In a security component C x with a set of t rules R x (r 1 ,r 2 ,....r i ,...r t ), if a rule r i is applicable for an IP paquet, so the remaining set of rules i.e rules from r i+1 to r t is ignored. This assumption preserve the set of rules order during the RDT construction algorithm treatement. 
The RDT construction
In this section, we will take some examples to explain the principle of decision tree branches' construction. The decision tree construction will be done recursively and will be explained in the decision tree construction algorithm (see section 3.3.3).
Let's take a security component C x with a set of 2 rules R x {r 1 , r 2 } having the following format:
∧ → figure 5 .a). ¯ We build Suffix_node(b 2 ,A 2,2 ) that we attach to the node e 1,2 (see step3 in figure 5.a). ¯ We update the decision tree structure notation. figure 5 .b). ¯ We update the decision tree structure notation. ¯ We update the decision tree structure notation. e e e e . However, for any packet whose value of attribute is in the set [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , it matches values of a sub-set in the set [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . As long as, any packet whose value of attribute is in the set [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , it matches values of a sub-set in the set [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Thus, we proceed as follows: ¯ We make 2 new edges in the tree; the first one from A 1,2 (A 1,2 =A 1,1 ) labeled ¯ We update the decision tree structure notation. ∧ → e = e . However, the two branches share the same edge value. In this case, ¯ We skip this node A 1,1 and look for the node A 2,1 (see step2 in figure 5.e). ¯ According to the several cases presented above (see cases 1,2,3 and 4), we attach Suffix_edge(b 2 ,e 2,2 ) to A 2,1 (see step3 in figure 5.e). ¯ We update the decision tree structure notation. 
Case Study: Security Component Set Of Rules Correction
In this section, we apply the RDT construction principle on the firewall FW set of rules in figure  3 . Figure 6 illustrates RDT FW the relevant decision tree of the set of rules R FW . Now, we convert the RDT FW branches into a set of rules. Based on Lemma 1, we note that these rules are free of anomalies (see table 1 ). 
Security Components Interoperability Checking (Process 2)
Let's take a distributed network composed of two relevants security components: the firewall "FW" and an intrusion detection system "IDS". Now, we will study FW and IDS interoperability in the network. To do that, we will study if there are misconfigurations between them.
Step D: Security Components Set Of Attributes Extraction (See Figure 1)
Let's suppose that FW and IDS are composed, respectively, of the set of rules R FW and R IDS . R FW is a set of t rules {r 1 
4.2
Step E: Security components set of rules extension (see figure 1) To be able to check FW and IDS interoperability in a network, they must share the same attributes. For that, we will extend the firewall FW set of rules format by adding the complementary attributes from the intrusion detection system IDS set of rules format and vice versa. The extended rules format, taking into account FW and IDS attributes is the following: Applying the extended format to FW set of rules, we obtain the following extended set of rules (see table 3 ). We note that for each attribute which has not a specific value, we put in the corresponding field "All". "All" means that this field accepts any value defined in the attribute's domain. The intrusion detection system IDS set of rules remains unchanged seeing that its set of attributes are conform to the extended rule format. 
Step F: Formal Security Components Interoperability Checking (See Figure 1)
Several works [13, 14, 15] have defined a set of anomalies detectable between rules in distributed security components called "distributed component anomalies". In the following, we will study these anomalies using the decision tree formalism. Then, we will propose a formal method to remove them.
Definition 5:
Let's take a network composed of a set of distributed hosts and several security components. Let a traffic stream flowing from sub-domain Dom x to sub-domain Dom y across two security components C x and C y installed on the network path between the two sub-domains (see figure 7 ) [14, 15] . At any point on this path in the direction of flow, C x is called the preceeding security component whereas C y is called a following security component. 
Distributed Security Components Anomalies Detection
In this section, we classify anomalies that may exist between rules in multi-security component environments. Let's take a rule r i ( 1 i t ) ≤ ≤ belonging to the preceding security component C x set of rules D x , and a rule q j ( 1 j z ) ≤ ≤ belonging to the following security component C y set of rules D y . We assume that every security component is relevant. Security components in a distributed system are interoperable, if and only if, for any two security components (C x ,C y ) where C x is the preceding security component and C y is the following security component, there are no anomalies between them (inter-shadowing anomaly, inter-spuriousness anomaly, inter-redundancy anomaly and inter-correlation anomaly)
Case study: Distributed Security Components Anomalies Detection
In our case study, based on 
Thus, they don't verify property 12. Therefore, they are non-interoperable in the network. In the next section, we will present a novel approach to remove these conflicts in order to guarantee their perfect interoperability between FW and IDS.(see process 3 in figure 1 ).
Security Components Interoperability Correction (Process 3)
The interoperability correction process guarantees the perfect interoperability between security components in a network. It is composed of the followings steps:
Step G: Security Components Set Of Rules Integration (See Figure 1)
In this step, we will put together the two security components set of rules in order to detect and correct misconfigurations between them (See step G in figure 1 ). For that, considering that the firewall is the preceding security component and the intrusion detection system is the following security component, we add IDS set of rules to those of FW. Eventually, we will update IDS set of rules order to get a coherent global set of rules (see column "Rules" in table 4). 
Step H: Formal Global Set Of Rules Correction (See Figure 1)
In this step, we will correct the global set of rules using the relevant decision tree formalism presented above (See section 3.3). The correction step consists in focusing on the set of rules and generating a new one free of anomalies (see example in section 3.3.3).
5.3
Step I: Specific Security Component Set Of Rules Extraction From The Global Set Of Rules (See Figure 1) To get a specific security component set of rules, we must extract it from the global one. From the returned relevant decision tree in step H, (see section 5.2) we will extract a sub-tree which represents the specific security component set of rules. This extraction is based on the specific security component predefined attributes. In the following section, we will define a projection operator which accepts, as input, a set of predefined security component set of attributes and the global security set of rules, and returns, as output, a specific security component set of rules in the form of a decision tree (see step I in figure 1 ). This operator removes all branches in RDT X whose attributes A i does not belong to Att X and their corresponding labeled value ≠ i, j (e All) .
Lemma 3
The component projection ߨ preserves the relevancy property.
Applying the projection operator to our case study, we will extract the firewall FW and the intrusion detection system IDS decision trees from the global RDT G . Let Att FW and Att IDS the set of attributes of FW and IDS.We note that: Let RDT G the relevant decision tree describing the global set of rules returned in step H (see section 5.2). By applying the "component projection", we have the following results: ¯ For the firewall FW, branches b 6 and b 10 will be removed considering that the attribute FW "Attack class" Att ∉ . Also, the branch b 12 will be removed considering that the attribute FW "Packet lenght" Att ∉ . ¯ For the intrusion detection system IDS, we will maintain all branches whose attribute All ass" "Attack cl ≠ that are b 6 , b 10 and b 12 .
From the returned RDT FW , we will remove the labeled edges "All" because these edges are insignificant in the security component's attributes. Contrary to that, RDT IDS remains unchanged considering that the set of used attributes represent Att IDS.
Finally, RDT FW and RDT IDS branches will be transformed into a set of rules. Table 5 and table 6 represent FW and IDS set of rules. Table 5 . The firewall FW set of relevant rules Table 6 . The intrusion detection system IDS set of relevant rules
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a decision tree based approach to check security components interoperability in a network. The interoperability verification procedure is based on several processes; the first one proceeds with a formal specification, verification and correction of the security component' set of rules. The second process checks the interoperability between several security components in the network. If the interoperability is not confirmed, the third process removes the detected misconfiguration to guarantee the perfect interoperability between the security components in the network. So, our approach ensures, on one hand, the security component consistency and on the other hand, the consistency of the distributed security components in the network.
